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Decolonisation and the “Federal Moment”
MICHAEL COLLINS
Post-1945 decolonisation involved the universal acceptance of
nation-statehood as the alternative to imperialism. Nationalism
vanquished its transnational competitors, notably imperialism and
Marxism. Alternatives to imperial rule that avoided sovereign states
on national lines, such as federations in the later 1940s and
1950s, have received less attention from historians. Federations
involved alternative ways of thinking about sovereignty, territorial-
ity, and political economy. British interest in creating federations,
for example the Central African Federation (CAF) in 1953, offers
some new perspectives on the strength of imperial ideology and
the determination to continue a missionary imperialism after the
Second World War. Federal thinking and practice was prominent
at this time in other European empires too, notably the French and
Dutch ones. The federal idea was also an aspect of the emerg-
ing European community. This is suggestive of a wider “federal
moment” that points to the importance of linking international,
trans-national, imperial, and world historical approaches.
Post-1945 decolonisation involved the universal acceptance of nation-
statehood as the alternative to imperialism.1 Nationalism vanquished its
transnational competitors, notably imperialism and Marxism. Alternatives to
imperial rule that resisted the logic of sovereign states on national lines,
such as the federations created by the British in the later 1940s and 1950s,
as well as post-imperial federations created by decolonising political elites,
have arguably received less attention from historians than they might.2 From
a British imperial perspective, the interest in creating federations offers
an opportunity to re-examine—within the context of the “decline, revival
and fall” of the British Empire—the role of imperial ideology and Britain’s
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22 M. Collins
determination to continue a missionary imperialism after World War II. But
federal thinking and practice was also prominent at this time in other
European empires too, notably the French and Dutch ones. Equally, the
federal idea was an aspect of the emerging European community. This is
suggestive of a wider post-1945 “federal moment” that is linked, in con-
trast to the longer history of thinking about federations or forms of “closer
union” in British imperial circles, to the failures of the inter-war nation-state
and the specific challenges posed by decolonisation and the creation of
national states after 1945. Federations involved alternative ways of thinking
about sovereignty, territoriality and political economy: a re-examination of
the rationale for their creation and the reasons for their failure may be of
some significance for historians looking back at the successes and failures
of the post-colonial nation-state. This article is an early attempt to sketch
some of the possible contours of what is a wide area of historical research.
The article proceeds on the basis that the intersection between international
and imperial history constitutes a key pathway for making sense of some
of the most important trans-national and world historical developments in
twentieth century history.3
Specifically, the paper looks at the British Labour governments of
1945–51, and some of the imperial challenges faced by Britain in south-
ern and central Africa immediately following the South African election
in 1948 and up to the creation of the Central African Federation (CAF)
under the Conservatives in 1953. These two events were interconnected,
with fears of Afrikaner territorial, economic and political expansion influenc-
ing British policy making in the region.4 The CAF—a federal realm of the
British crown formed in 1953 by combining northern and southern Rhodesia
with Nyasaland—involved a denial of the principle of nationality. It thus ran
counter to a broad, if loosely defined acceptance of the emergence of African
nationalism by senior Labour figures. The abstract idea of national self-
determination gave way to the practical developmentalist imperialism that
came naturally to many senior Labour politicians and policy-makers. In addi-
tion, acute and multiple problems of race and identity arose in the southern
and central African region in the late 1940s, which impacted upon both
policy-making and wider, less tangible perceptions of Britain’s imperial and
national self. British policy makers redefined the terms of collaboration with
both white colonists and black nationalists, allowing them to secure on-going
control of political power and resources. Federation was thus ambivalent, a
move towards decolonisation as well as a means of securing imperial con-
trol. But insofar as federation can be read as a form of the “imperialism
of decolonisation,”5 the politics of Britain’s imperial identity were causal as
the British re-articulated justifications for the control of African peoples and
resources. It is significant—especially for those who are interested in lega-
cies of empire and decolonisation in the metrople—that this took place at a
relatively late stage, within the era of decolonisation itself. The events and
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Decolonisation and the “Federal Moment” 23
debates leading up to the creation of the CAF in 1953 reveal a conjuncture
of problems relating to imperial identity, imperial politics and international
pressures. Underlying these is a wider historical space in which the very idea
of sovereignty and nation-statehood was being contested.
Variations of the federal idea have a long history in British imperial
thinking. The motivations for federal plans were most often a mixture of
practical, administrative, and cost-saving schemes, and sometimes sugared
with romantic notions of imperial unity. As early as the seventeenth century,
a federal model was floated as a solution to reducing the financial burden of
defending the West Indian plantations.6 In the late eighteenth century, figures
including Adam Smith and Lord Shelburne met the crisis in the American
colonies with calls for federation.7 But it was the end of the nineteenth
and beginning of the twentieth century that saw the emergence of a more
concerted and widespread movement for imperial federation and greater
imperial unity.
The “colonial question” had come to the fore increasingly from the
1860s with “empire unity” occasionally demanded, and numerous schemes
“for federation, confederation, union, a colonial council, council represen-
tatives in Parliament, or occasional colonial conferences” advanced. “Little
emerged from the talk,” and yet “many of these ideas were to crop up again
and again for nearly a century.”8 One notable though short-lived venture
was the Imperial Federation League in 1884. Looking to Canada by way of
example, the League advocated an imperial parliament for Britain and the
self-governing territories gaining support from familiar figures in the “Greater
Britain” debate such as J. R. Seeley and J. A. Froude.9 The British branch of
the League was formally dissolved in 1894, undermined by divisions over
the necessity of putting forward formal proposals for federation versus the
development of a forum for an ongoing conversation about imperial ties and
closer association. The increasingly fraught debate over free trade and tariff
protection also split enthusiasts for federation at this time.
Even so, the theme was given renewed impetus by the creation of the
Round Table Movement in 1909, with the journal of the same name founded
in 1910. The Movement initially pressed for organic union, but ultimately
for a Commonwealth of independent nation states, ironically the antithesis
of such a union. The Round Table Movement consisted largely of acolytes
of Lord Milner, his so-called “kindergarten” men such as Lionel Curtis. The
union in South Africa prompted thinking about a wider conception of union.
In his more lofty and idealistic moments Curtis envisaged “an organic union
to be brought about by some establishment of an Imperial government,
constitutionally responsible to all the electors of the Empire, and with power
to act directly on individual citizens.”10 More concretely, even in light of the
recent Entente with France and Agreement with Russia, Curtis argued that a
“business arrangement for the support and control of Imperial defence and
foreign policy of the Empire” was necessary, or the empire “must break up.”11
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24 M. Collins
The impact of World War I on this kind of thinking was ambiguous. On the
one hand, there was a well-documented increase in Dominion assertiveness,
nationalism even. On the other, it also led to the development of greater
imperial participation in decision making at the centre. When, in December
1916, Lloyd George became Prime Minister, with the Milnerite and founding
member of the Round Table Philip Kerr as his Private Secretary, his call for a
special imperial war conference in 1917 and the creation of an Imperial War
Cabinet “came close to becoming the first executive for the whole empire.”12
What is noticeable is that calls for federation or closer union between
Britain and its empire, by which its advocates almost always meant the
colonies of white settlement, tended to be more vigorous and achieve greater
resonance at times of perceived weakness or vulnerability. If the Balfour
Declaration of 1926 and the Statute of Westminster constituted shifts towards
greater independence for the Dominions, the Great Depression forced a
shift in the opposition direction, towards greater economic inter-dependence.
Here practical necessity tended to crowd out the loftier rhetoric of an earlier
period. Even so, the shift towards a more clearly defined and articulated
national identity on the part of the Dominions pointed toward a future
Commonwealth rather than any previously imagined imperial federation.
The significance of this for our understanding of post-1945 fed-
eral experiments is twofold. The problem of colonial nationalism would
inevitably grow beyond the Dominions and India and would thus threaten
British control and influence in colonial territories. At the same time, the
strength of the association between Britain and its empire clearly remained
fundamental to the maintenance of a British world role. Commonwealth
would be central to this, and this would shape the British approach to nation-
alism. Federation would no longer be conceived as an imperial endeavour
formally constituting the relations between metropole and colony, but rather
as a way of maintaining British influence in particular parts of the empire,
a way of reconfiguring the politics of collaboration so as to defy the logic
of nationalism with its fetishisation of sovereign territoriality and hence to
maintain key British spheres of influence. What is surprising, perhaps, is the
enthusiasm with which some key British officials in the later 1940s pursued
this objective, for example Sir Andrew Cohen at the Colonial Office.
In this sense, although the formal structure of the relationship may have
changed, the central objective of maintaining Britain’s world role and the
ideological belief in a liberal civilising mission is suggestive of a longer run
connection between the post-war period and the earlier liberal imperialists
such as Milner. As Jack Gallagher put it some time ago, “between the wars
British statesmen had been fearful for their empire. It had seemed so fragile
that another great war might well knock it to pieces. That did not hap-
pen. Whatever caused the end of empire, it was not the Second World War,
although this conclusion will not please those who think that the world came
to an end in 1945, or those who think that the world’s great age began anew
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Decolonisation and the “Federal Moment” 25
in 1945.”13 Gordon Martel, in his critique of what he saw as Paul Kennedy’s
economic determinist view of decline, stressed the importance of will and
ideas in this process of imperial reconfiguration. This is interesting14 and per-
tinent to the federal moment of the 1950s in which will, desire and idea are
indeed stressed over and above means. The post war “federal moment” is
thus explicitly associated with decolonisation and the challenges of colonial
nationalism, and yet the desire and imagination to maintain Britain’s world
role were arguably of an earlier vintage.
In his work on Sir Andrew Cohen, Ronald Robinson attributed a degree
of progressive foresight to the British Colonial Office in terms of its post-
1945 attitude towards decolonisation, specifically in Africa.15 With India
liberated, Palestine abandoned, and Malaya under threat, active steps were
taken to reorient British imperialism towards the strategically important site
of the Middle East, and to re-think the British role in Africa. In fact this pro-
cess and the ideas that pushed it forward had been underway before the
war, partially embodied in the progressive figure of Malcolm MacDonald,
Secretary of State for the Colonies from May 1938 to May 1940, and the
personal zeal that he brought to the Colonial Development and Welfare Act
of 1940. The shift in colonial policy towards Africa should not be seen as
a direct consequence of the war and the loss of imperial assets or prestige
that the British subsequently endured. Lord Hailey’s influential Africa Survey,
published in 1938, was an important moment in the steady re-evaluation of
the Lugardian idea of “trusteeship” that had framed African societies and cul-
tures as static, essentially ahistorical entities, with the British as benevolent
guardians, and in this regard at least primus inter pares when compared to
rival colonial powers.16
The flattering and deeply misleading self-image embodied in famous
Together wartime propaganda poster was indicative of British attempts
to portray their diverse “multi-racial” empire as the nemesis of Fascism’s
attempted racial holocaust. Their efforts were complicated, amongst other
things, by the obvious on-going economic exploitation underpinning the
empire, the brutal suppression of Gandhi’s 1942 “Quit India” campaign
and the awkward colour bar between black and white American G.I.s that
drew so much attention in wartime London, and in the British West Indies.
The Atlantic Charter of 1941, which Churchill had done so much to resist,
changed the tone of international public opinion.17 With the 1945 Charter of
the United Nations declaring “the respect for the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples” as one of its basic purposes, a sec-
ond and, from the perspective of nationalists, more promising “Wilsonian
moment” was well under-way.18 Amongst its many foreign policy challenges,
the Labour government would have to respond to this new environment.
Colonial Office policy shifts towards Africa certainly accelerated in
the later 1940s. It was not only domestic and international public opin-
ion that was changing, but also the politics of collaboration in the colonies
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26 M. Collins
themselves. In the face of rising African nationalism, which would increase
in the foreseeable future, the Colonial Office deemed it necessary that the
aforementioned “trusteeship model” of indirect rule—whereby the British
struck deals with African chiefs in order to maintain control of territory—
needed revision. Increasing urbanisation was underway in Britain’s African
colonies, and labour unrest was taking on surprisingly violent forms, notably
in Accra in 1948.19 Urgent action was required to improve Britain’s position.
A major component of this was to be the so-called “new approach”
to local government in Africa advanced by Arthur Creech Jones, Secretary
of State for the Colonies, and Andrew Cohen, Assistant Under-Secretary of
State, and Creech Jones’ “alter ego.”20 The purpose was to bring greater
African participation into the affairs of government. Robinson, in one of
the only significant scholarly works on Cohen, claimed that the May 1947
“Cohen Report” which outlined four stages of constitutional advance to incor-
porate Africans into local democracy, foresaw most African dependencies
being self-governing within a generation. Cohen’s “revolutionary manifesto”
was “inspired by the belief that if the dependencies were to be devel-
oped economically, their administration would have to be democratised and
nationalised.”21 But the general political radicalism of Labour’s approach and
support for nationalism and decolonisation has been grossly overstated.22 If
we are to understand why Labour begins to acquiesce in the creation of the
CAF by the late 1940s this misperception needs to be cleared up. In fact, in
the 1947 report only the Gold Coast was viewed as being capable of self-
government “in a generation.” Elsewhere, internal self-government would
take substantially longer. Independence is not even discussed.23
Cohen is a key figure here, whom Robinson presents as embodying the
spirit of the new policy, labelling him the “proconsul of African national-
ism,” rather misleadingly suggesting that his “constitution mongering” was
awakening the “slumbering genius” of national politics.24 Early in his career
at the Colonial Office, Cohen had gravitated towards the Fabian wing of the
Labour Party. The Fabian Colonial Bureau (FCB), founded in 1940, might be
seen as a spiritual home, and along with Creech Jones, Cohen corresponded
with, and highly regarded the opinion of, key figures in the FCB such as Rita
Hinden and Marjory Perham. In true Fabian spirit, the new approach to Africa
was not primarily constitutional but socio-economic and socio-political.25
In some senses, Fabians and democratic socialists from the British
Labour Party could have their cake and eat it too. They could make efforts at
colonial development which sought to increase dollar earning exports and
thus benefit the metropole in a period of desperate dollar shortage, whilst
simultaneously (and arguably sincerely) believing that in the longer run
this new economic development would create the socio-economic under-
pinnings of “de-tribalised” societies with a functioning civil society: trade
unions, political parties, news media. Modernised indigenous elites would
make excellent future collaborators—not least for Labour governments—in
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Decolonisation and the “Federal Moment” 27
a post-imperial world where formal constitutional decolonisation gave way
to looser but still substantial economic and political cooperation through
Commonwealth.
Rita Hinden, looking back from the perspective of 1959 on the FCB and
its role in post-war imperial policy, put Labour’s predicament thus:
To this massive legacy, the socialists were heirs; they had the duty to
decide on its use. Enjoy it? No, that would have been a violation of social-
ist principle. Reject it outright, and so remain true to the anti-imperialism
which socialists had always preached? Or, better still perhaps, accept
the heritage, but with the determination to nurse and develop it for the
advantage of its rightful owners till they themselves should have come of
age?26
Hinden recognised the “poverty and backwardness” of the colonies had
been deepened by imperialism, by “extorting the . . . wealth and alienating
. . . land from the people, by taxation and forced labour, by the despoliation
of the soil.” But, she believed that “even before the entry of imperialist
powers, the colonial territories were poor and economically backward” and
that poverty might “be sooner cured by prolonging imperial rule” than by
moving too quickly toward independence.27 Getting Labour’s approach to
empire straight is thus crucial in understanding not simply the acceptance of
federation in central Africa, but ultimately its advocacy. Neither nationalism
nor democracy was of paramount importance. What mattered was steady
and consistent social and economic development, and inter alia, continued
British control. British missionary imperialism was in rude health under
Labour.
Margaret Joy Tibbets, a sharp-witted political officer at the United States
Embassy in London, saw the point early on. In a memorandum on “British
Colonial Development and Welfare Programs” she wrote that “it is the opin-
ion of the United States Embassy at London, that [Labour’s approach to
colonial development] is intended primarily to provide increased foodstuffs
and other primary products for the British people.”28 This was undoubtedly
true, but the realties of the Cold War, the apparent unpreparedness of African
peoples to govern themselves and the predatory threat of Communist infiltra-
tion were already softening the United States government’s attitude towards
the British Empire.29 The early Cold War made the southern African region
a strategic asset first and foremost because of South Africa’s rich source of
uranium, and instability in the region caused by political and racial ten-
sions offered opportunities to the Soviet Union to foment unrest, threatening
this rich and vital source of nuclear material.30 Hence the extent to which
“London retained a good deal of its old determination to shape the terms of
collaboration and make things happen on the ground”31 became increas-
ingly important to the United States, and opened up new opportunities
for the Labour government to reinvigorate colonial policy. In fact, Labour’s
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28 M. Collins
redeployment of imperial power in Africa after World War II, with hun-
dreds of new bureaucrats and the burgeoning of a technocratic, imperialist
developmentalism, has been called a “second colonial occupation”.32 The
United States would not stand in the way of the British if this meant Britain’s
empire would remain a bulwark against the encroachments of communism
in Africa, and to this end Marshall Aid was allowed to be spent within the
empire.33
Despite some recent corrections from Cooper and Hyam on the Labour
Party and Africa c. 1945–51, Robinson’s triumphalist account of the Colonial
Office—particularly his version of Cohen’s role—continues to deflect our
attention from an important moment in the decolonisation process in which
both trusteeship and a new civilising mission make a return. The creation of
the CAF is an important case in point. Some kind of amalgamation or feder-
ation of Britain’s central African territories had been mooted for some time,
an idea largely pushed forward by the white settler community for its own
purposes. Yet in early 1948 Creech Jones had declared to Roy Welensky,
Prime Minister of Northern Rhodesia, that the Labour Government, indeed
“no government” would “abandon” millions of black Africans in Nyasaland
and the Rhodesias to rule by a minority of white settlers.34 But in September
of the same year Cohen’s private meetings with United States diplomats
in London led them to surmise that the British government believed the
interests of Africans in southern and central would suffer “if Whitehall’s pro-
tecting hand were withdrawn.”35 Federation was looking increasingly likely.
By September 1950 American diplomats produced a secret Memorandum
of Conversation for Washington’s consumption in which they directly quote
Cohen as saying that “it would obviously be advantageous to have a strong
federated Rhodesia as a counterweight to the Union [of South Africa].”36 In
the context of this particular federal project, the “race problem” and the
South African bogeyman were crucial drivers of British policy, allowing a
paternalistic imperialism to side-line black African nationalism (specifically in
Nyasaland) in favour of a new British dominion in central Africa. The spectre
of a pan-Afrikaner alliance that had prompted Milner and Chamberlain to go
to war in 1899 reared its head again.37 More broadly, the denial of national
sentiment in favour of non-national geo-political reform begs the question
of whether a more pervasive strategy is underway.
The problems Britain faced on its southern African imperial periphery
after 1945 were manifold. Sympathy for newly defeated German fascism
in some quarters of the Afrikaner community re-opened and accentuated
old divisions between the Afrikaner and Anglo worlds. From London’s per-
spective, the growing political power of the Nationalist Party under Daniel
Malan did not augur well. The South African election of May 1948 brought
the (Afrikaner) National Party to power. The Nationalists did not con-
ceal their commitment to the most rigid separation of the races. In July
1949 the Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act became law in South Africa,
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Decolonisation and the “Federal Moment” 29
making a marriage between a “European” and a “non-European” a criminal
offence. Further efforts to increase segregation followed. The long-standing
discrimination against the South African Indian community, which had
equally been a feature of Smuts’ United Party rule, was now internation-
alised via Jawaharal Nehru’s vigorous efforts to censure South Africa through
the United Nations and its new status as a Dominion within the British
Commonwealth. South Africa’s desire to incorporate the British protectorates
of Swaziland, Basutoland and Bechuanaland existed since the Union was
created and Dominion status conferred in 1910. Under Nationalist Party
government from 1948 incorporation was pursued with renewed vigour.
In addition, South African ambitions to annex South West Africa (mod-
ern day Namibia) and the underlying possibility that Britain’s dependent
white settler colonies in southern and northern Rhodesia may gravitate—by
desire, design, or accident—towards South African-style apartheid was an
omnipresent concern in Whitehall. South African sensitivities over all these
matters caused chronic anxiety in London about the possibility of South
Africa declaring itself a republic and leaving the Commonwealth (as it would
eventually do in May 1961).
All these issues, falling as they do under the umbrella of South African
expansionism, were further exacerbated by indigenous black political mobil-
isation. In Nyasaland, a new sense of black African political resistance gained
ground. Northern Rhodesia contained a large indigenous population, which
suffered exploitation in the copper mines and other extractive industries that
dominated its economy. The struggles of indigenous peoples in South West
Africa were brought to the attention of international public opinion through
the United Nations and the political activism of the English Anglican reverend
Michael Scott, considered a “communist” by the United States.38 Amidst these
myriad complications, the event that captured the British domestic mood
most strongly, and in turn re-shaped the terrain upon which Labour had to
make its southern African policy, is the marriage of Seretse Khama to Ruth
Williams.
It was September 1948 when Seretse Khama, a black African man from
the Bechuanaland Protectorate, studying law in England, married a white
English girl, Ruth Williams, at the Kensington Registry Office in London.
Unfortunately for the newly married couple, Seretse was not just any old law
student from Africa. He was the grandson of Khama the Great, destined to
become the Kgosi (Chief) of the Bangwato, the largest and politically most
significant tribe in the Bechuanaland Protectorate. Seretse’s uncle, Tshekedi,
was the current Regent, recognised by the British Administration as the
Native Authority pending Seretse’s accession, once he was of the right age.
The marriage of Seretse Khama and Ruth Williams caused problems
for successive British governments, first under Attlee’s Labour Party and then
under the Conservatives. Most importantly for our purposes, in the late 1940s
these fears fed into the on-going discussions about the CAF. In short, the
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30 M. Collins
“white settler problem” and the advent of Pretoria’s Nationalist apartheid
policy were key drivers of British policy towards southern Africa and the
CAF. The extent to which the Malan government in Pretoria was dictating
British policy in southern Africa reveals the link between race politics and
Britain’s self-perception as a benign power still capable of a progressive
liberal imperialism. Moreover, the way in which the Seretse affair taps into
pre-existing beliefs about the superiority of British civilisation helps us to
understand the turn towards federation in central Africa.
Soon after Malan’s election, Seretse Khama and Ruth Williams were
declared prohibited immigrants in the Union of South Africa. This may not
have come as a surprise to Labour ministers, nor would it, in and of itself,
have been particularly destabilising of British policy in the region. The com-
plicating factor was the calls of successive South African governments to
have the three High Commission Territories—Seretse’s native Bechuanaland,
as well as Swaziland and Basutoland—incorporated into the Union of South
Africa.39 Under these circumstances, Labour ministers were advised that to
give the title of “Native Authority” to an African who had married a white
woman would be regarded as a deliberate provocation in South Africa. Malan
would use the opportunity to renew calls for the transfer of the Territories,
and to do so with the cross-party backing of the whites in the Union, as a
way of setting his own back yard in order, as Pretoria saw it. He would also
have the support of Sir Godfrey Huggins, the Prime Minister of Southern
Rhodesia, which was made clear in a statement to the all white Legislative
Assembly in Salisbury (Harare) on 7 July 1949.40
On the same day, after a meeting with Seretse Khama in Mafeking,
Evelyn Baring, High Commissioner in Bechuanaland, had, in his own words,
“his first opportunity of seeking help” from Douglas Forsyth, the Secretary
of South Africa’s Department of External Affairs. A top secret and per-
sonal letter was then sent to the Permanent Under-Secretary of State in
the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO London), Sir Percival Leisching.
Baring made it clear to Leisching that Forsyth had been very clear with him.
Forsyth, Baring reported, had discussed the whole matter with Malan, who
had in turn discussed the question with his ministers and was greatly worried
and distressed. Baring told Leisching that two points had emerged, and they
warrant quoting in full:
First, official recognition of Seretse as chief, so long as it implies the resi-
dence in Serowe [Bechuanaland] of his English wife and the performance
by her of the duties of the first wife of a chief is what really matters to
the members of the government and probably to most South Africans.
The mere residence of Seretse and his wife in Serowe without official
recognition is objectionable to them, but in Forsyth’s view of subsidiary
importance. He hopes that it might be avoided, but it is the recognition
of Seretse as chief which will be the match to set off the gunpowder.
Huggins has also written to me taking exactly the same point of view.41
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Decolonisation and the “Federal Moment” 31
Secondly, Baring added:
[t]he political consequences in the Union of recognition would be far
more serious than I had realised. . . . The more extreme Nationalists will
use the Seretse incident to add fuel to those flames. They will argue that
our action demonstrates the folly of allowing the existence side by side
in southern Africa of two systems of native administration diametrically
opposed to one another. They will go on to say that South Africa should
not and cannot remain associated with a country which recognises offi-
cially an African chief married to a white woman, and they will make
Seretse’s recognition the occasion of an appeal of the country for the
establishment of a republic, and not only of a republic but a republic
outside the Commonwealth. Malan is desperately worried and feels he
could not successfully oppose an extremist offensive on these lines.42
In a minute to Philip Noel-Baker—the Secretary of State for
Commonwealth Relations—Leisching informed him that in addition to the
communication from Baring, he had been separately told by General Byers,
Chief of the South African General Staff, that the British government’s recog-
nition of Seretse as chief of the Bangwato would “light a fire through all
the British colonial territories in Africa which would not soon be quenched.”
Leisching went on to tell Noel-Baker that “the very existence of white settle-
ment in these territories depended, in light of the numerical inferiority and
defencelessness of the white population, upon the principle that the native
mind regarded the white woman as inviolable.” He himself, he added, had
been unable to accept the “ultimate logical consequences of this principle
of non-discrimination when it takes practical forms affecting oneself or one’s
family in terms of miscegenation.” He did not “believe that many who hold
to their antipathy to the colour bar would, if confronted with this matter
in personal terms, view with equanimity, or indeed without revulsion, the
prospect of their son or daughter marrying a member of the Negro race.”43
The most senior civil servant at the CRO clearly viewed the problem through
the prism of both race and gender. Gordon Walker responded with his sup-
port for Baring’s proposal: “I would not put out of court the possibility of
declaring that a chief cannot have a white wife. There is a lot to be said for
this argument, and we should consider facing the uproar that would result.
We must all think about this carefully.”44
Baring’s encounter with Forsyth appears to have decisively influenced
his thinking, and in turn influenced the position of the British govern-
ment. Having previously been minded to recognise Seretse as Chief, Baring
changed his position, saying the right course was now to “play for time” via
a commission of enquiry, which was subsequently set up under the chair-
manship of Lord Harrigan, a course of action that Noel-Baker was willing to
follow. For political reasons, the Harrigan Report came to the required con-
clusion that Seretse should not be recognised as Kgosi of the Bangwato. But
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it added, uncomfortably for the Labour government, that Seretse’s “prospects
of success as a Chief are as bright as those of any native in Africa. . . . He
is admittedly the lawful and legitimate heir and, save for his unfortunate
marriage, would be in our opinion, a fit and proper person to assume the
chieftainship.”45 In light of this Noel-Baker warned Attlee that the Harragin
Report was “an inflammable document.”46 Attlee was suitably alarmed. “The
document is most disturbing,” he said. “In effect we are invited to go contrary
to the desires of the great majority of the Bangwato tribe, solely because of
the attitude of the governments of the Union of South Africa and Southern
Rhodesia. It is as if we had been obliged to agree to Edward VIII’s abdication
so as not to annoy the Irish Free State and the United States of America.47
Attlee decided that the Report should be referred to the Cabinet but then
accepted the advice of Gordon Walker that it should not be published. The
Harrigan Report was suppressed for 30 years.
Following the February 1950 General Election Gordon Walker was
promoted to Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, replacing Noel-
Baker. With Leisching now his Permanent Under-Secretary, Gordon Walker
took the matter to the Cabinet with a new set of proposals. Seretse and Ruth
would be banished from the Bechuanaland Protectorate. His proposals were
accepted and a statement seeking approval was to be made to Parliament.48
Gordon Walker faced concern about the course of action proposed from
all sides of the House of Commons. The integrity of the government was
in question. The Seretse affair had become a cause celebre amongst the
anti-colonial left in Britain, and a propaganda coup for the Soviet Union.49
Churchill called the whole affair a “very disreputable transaction.”50
In our understanding of the extent to which the race issue shaped
British government policy, it is important to note that during the House of
Commons debate on Seretse, Reginald Sorenson, a Labour member, asked
Gordon Walker whether South Africa had had any influence on the gov-
ernment’s decision. Gordon Walker replied in unambiguous language: “we
have had no communication from the government of the Union nor have we
made any communication to them. There have been no representations and
no consultation in this matter.”51 Gordon Walker’s statement to Parliament
was followed by a White Paper which said: “His Majesty’s Government were
of course aware that a strong body of European opinion in South Africa
would be opposed to recognition; but as stated in the House of Commons
on the 8 March, no representations on this matter have been received from
the government of the Union of South Africa or Southern Rhodesia.” Hyam
has referred explicitly to this incident and suggested Gordon Walker was
“perilously close” to lying.52 In fact, it is almost certainly clear that this was
indeed a lie to the House. On 30 June 1949, prior to Baring being persuaded
by Pretoria, Lief Egeland, South African High Commissioner in London, had
a meeting with Gordon Walker’s predecessor, Noel Baker, in which he made
the very same case about the impact of recognising Seretse’s marriage on
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white opinion in the Union and beyond. He had made clear to the Secretary
of State that his visit was on the instructions of his Prime Minister, Malan,
and Gordon Walker could not reasonably claim he, or his civil servants,
were unaware of this.53
Either way, senior Labour ministers were paranoid about the race issue
and the impact it could have on Britain’s strategic position in Africa. A paper
presented by Gordon Walker to Cabinet in September 1950 claimed, fear-
ing South American expansion, that “the policies we detest in the Union,”
could be “established far to the North, and in the heart of this part of our
Colonial Empire.” He envisaged “terrible wars . . . between a white ruled East
Africa and a black ruled Western Africa,” and warned his colleagues that “our
whole work in Africa would be undone.”54 Fred Cooper has suggested that
after World War II, “[t]he old claims to colonial authority based on superior-
ity of race and civilisation were thoroughly discredited.”55 This, as Cooper
expertly shows, required Labour to justify its developmental imperialism in
technocratic terms. And yet arguments about race and civilisation do remain
of great importance.
The conjuncture of race alongside geo-strategic considerations trumped
the idea that amalgamation and federation in Central Africa should be
postponed in order to protect the native African from white supremacist
ideologies, both from within the Rhodesias and spreading out of the Union.
Now, members of the Labour Party took heed of the warnings out of Pretoria,
because they fed into pre-existing beliefs about the superiority of British
values and the on-going need for Britain to nurture and protect the black
African. They therefore acted against Seretse’s interests, persuaded that a
new dominion north of the Limpopo (the river separating the Union of
South Africa from Southern Rhodesia) was a higher goal. The fact that this
British bloc was supposed to stand for British “multi-racial” values against
the alien impact of the Afrikaner merely adds to the irony of Seretse’s treat-
ment. Cohen’s conversations with American diplomats in September 1950, in
which he reveals the radical shift from the position he held in 1949—now
believing that “it would obviously be advantageous” to have a federated
central Africa as a counterweight to South Africa—was contemporaneous to
Gordon Walker’s apocalyptic vision of race war in Africa, the Cabinet dis-
cussions about Seretse, the suppression of the Harrigan Report and Gordon
Walker’s deceitful statement to the House of Commons. By April 1951, in a
confidential minute, Cohen warned of the “Afrikaner danger” and Britain’s
“duty to the welfare of Africans.” In the context of Northern Rhodesia and
Nyasaland, Cohen stated that the native problem was one of bringing them
round to a “true realisation of their own interests.”56 In these matters it is
difficult to establish a forensic causal link, but the connection here seems to
be irresistible.
By the end of 1951 Cohen felt that it was now crucial not to abandon the
field to “black nationalists,” which would have “disastrous consequences.”57
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Robinson’s so-called proconsul of African nationalism was taking a different
stance. Cohen is perhaps better understood as a defender of a particular
vision of British liberalism, one with a long pedigree, and for historical pur-
poses this may be more interesting than the anodyne picture presented by
Robinson. It is important to recognise the ways in which this vision was
redeployed after World War II, indicating as it does the on-going vitality
of the British imperial mission long after 1945, the scepticism about the
nation-state that cut across party lines, and divisions between the civil service
and politicians.
In August 1952, Henry Hopkinson, now Minister of State at the Colonial
Office under Winston Churchill’s Conservative Government, held sixty-eight
meetings in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, coming to the conclusion
that any further delay would merely encourage “nascent nationalism.”58 By
the time the CAF came into being in 1953 it was accepted that Southern
Rhodesia would benefit economically from northern raw materials, and that
Nyasaland would provide a large pool of black labour. The issue of the
colour bar in the northern copper belt was fudged. With this in mind,
the suggestion that it was only after the Conservatives came to power
in 1951 that we see the return of “old-fashioned imperialism” is surely
misleading.59 There were some cases of consistency. Attlee, for example,
stuck to his belief that federation in central Africa ran counter to “the entire
premise of Labour’s African policy” because it set back the cause of African
nationalism.60 But we have seen how, in this instance, earlier talk in Labour
circles about political reform and the advance of black African nationalism
came to be superseded by a renewed vision of British imperial mission, a
vision that was accompanied by the implementation, eventually under the
Conservatives, of a tremendously ambitious, ultimately foolhardy project of
imperial state-building, a civilising mission, familiar in content but new in
form.
For the black Africans of Nyasaland and northern Rhodesia, talk of
socio-economic advancement and preparation for self-government had been
replaced by a new trusteeship and the re-mergence of pre-Word War II
approaches to collaboration on the British imperial periphery, embodied
in Hopkinson’s Lugardian conclusion that the black Africans of the CAF
would accept federation “taking their lead from the chiefs.”61 The history of
British imperial policy in southern Africa under Labour suggests that the great
changes apparently signalled by the Cohen Report of 1947 stalled in the face
of Afrikaner nationalism, white settler politics, and the complexities of race
relations. The missionary imperialism of key Fabian influences on the Labour
Party had always been pronounced. The turn to federation in central Africa,
what Hyam has called “the most controversial large-scale imperial exercise
in constructive state-building ever undertaken by the British government,”62
enabled the continuation of British control in central Africa and constituted a
late flowering of a deep-rooted, cross-party and inter-governmental belief in
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Britain’s liberal imperial mission. It is suggestive that will and ambition could
still imagine their triumph over a paucity of resources.63
The CAF is but one instance of federation, and the story has only been
told from the perspective of high politics in the metropole. If there are links
between the missionary imperialism of an earlier age, which animated ideas
about federation, union, and commonwealth prior to 1945, the post-1945 fed-
eral moment is different, being explicitly a problem of decolonisation. The
nascent Commonwealth would be a commonwealth of independent nation
states. The federal option as deployed by the British meant resisting the
logic of nationalism as a response to the challenges of decolonisation, and
in the case of the CAF the pressures of white settler politics.
Having acted as bridge between Labour and Conservative administra-
tions in the negotiations over the CAF, Cohen went on to become Governor
of Uganda in 1952. His time there is remembered rather well by many
Ugandans, especially for his liberal and tolerant views, his focus on social
and economic development, and his racial inclusivity. But it was not with-
out controversy. Cohen exiled the Kabaka of Buganda in 1953, essentially
because of the Kabaka’s attempt to steer the course of Ugandan decoloni-
sation toward a state based on Buganda, rather than the whole protectorate
established by the British in 1894. In fact, Cohen was also very interested
in an East African Federation to match the Central African one. The idea
of an east African federation prompted vigorous political debate, support
and opposition, in London and in east Africa itself. It would be picked
up by local political leaders and newly independent states as a possible
way to realise greater cooperation and put pan-African ideals into practice.
As Julius Nyerere put it in 1964, “there is one way in East Africa that the
present unity of opposition should become a unity of construction. The
unity and freedom movements should be combined, and the East African
territories achieve independence as one unit . . . this means Federation of
the Territories now administered separately.”64 The story of the failure of
east African federation needs to be told, both from the perspective of colo-
nial authorities and, crucially, from the perspective of indigenous political
elites.65 Why did federation seem like a good idea? In asking this ques-
tion, the possible flaws of the nation-state model itself would be central
to the discussion of the failure of the post-colonial state, alongside the
neo-colonialism of former imperial powers or the inequities of the world
economy.66
Answering these kinds of historical questions would take us into a wider
field of inquiry, one in which the historical constitution of the nation-state in
the post-war period could be re-examined. Whereas the Atlantic Charter and
the Charter of the United Nations had envisaged the triumph of national self-
determination, the 1950s was also a moment of deep aporia surrounding the
viability of the nation-state. As Ernest Gellner articulated so precisely, nation-
alism as an ideology holds that “the political and the national unit should be
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congruent.”67 The application of that principle had been one of the key
drivers of two world wars. Paradoxically, empire explicitly resists national-
ist logic. So too does federation. Yet the compression of the historical space
between empire and nation-state has arguably prevented us from asking how
it was that for the purposes of decolonisation, national states became the only
alternative to empires.68 In the post-war period federal questions arose in
regard to other European empires.69 The United States was supportive of the
idea of European federation.70 Questions of federal and “world government”
continued to coalesce around debates about the United Nations.71 These may
not be incidental connections, but may point to a historical moment in which
decolonisation and the relationships between empire, nation, sovereignty,
identity, and political economy were being questioned. This comes at a time
when, as Charles Maier has suggested, the territorial basis of nation-statehood
was already weakening.72
Raising our sights a little we realise that the CAF was not isolated.
There were numerous federations or mooted federations across the British
Empire during this period, including the Malay Federation, 1948–1963; the
East African High Commission, 1948–1961; the previously discussed Central
African Federation, 1953–1963; the West Indies Federation, 1958–1962; and
the Federation of South Arabia, 1962–1967. These were not always British ini-
tiatives, with nationalists and other agents in the colonies themselves thinking
through the possibilities of federation for their own ends. But the sheer
breadth of federal experiments is suggestive of a deeper historical connec-
tion to ideologies of power and structures of identity, the significance of
which may be lost if we understand these manoeuvres strictly in terms of
a peripheral theory of collaboration and control. The idea of a federated
empire has long and deep roots in British imperial ideology. Clearly the
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland is distinct from the dream of a fed-
erated white Empire-Commonwealth imagined by the advocates of Greater
Britain in the late nineteenth century, or the protagonists of the Round Table
Movement which pushed the idea forward throughout the twentieth cen-
tury. The British had already imposed a federal constitution on India. But
exactly what is the relationship between idea of federation in the late 1940s
and 1950s and that previous tradition? How did questions of empire, nation-
hood, sovereignty, and territoriality play themselves out across the canvas of
a decolonising British Empire?
Moreover, that canvas was in fact far bigger than the British Empire.
The decolonising federal moment was a genuinely trans-national, world his-
torical one, which deserves deeper, comparative historical analysis.73 This
will hopefully reveal the complex ways in which historical actors at both
the core and periphery of empires imagined alternative forms of sovereignty
and political organisation, forms which it my yet serve us well to re-examine
from our postcolonial present.
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